Flying Pink Unicorns

My thoughts on Afghanistan/Pakistan

I begin with the assumption that the Taliban would get KILLED in a free and fair country-wide election. That is, although they have real pockets of support among the Pashtuns on the border, they are not a genuinely popular movement, as Mao's communists were, and so many successful revolutionaries were. They were wildly unpopular, by all accounts, the first time around.

I'm no Afghan expert, but I'm told they don't have a ton of support. Remember, Al Queda in Iraq looked like they had real Sunni support, until the Sunni leaders turned on their asses and asked the infidels, ie. US, to help kill them, b/c they horribly overplayed their hand. The Taliban was a foreign import, rather than a genuine Afghan movement. They were really installed by Pakistan's intelligence service (the ISI) as a way to stabalize and have a tad of control over their northern neighbor. Control didn't quite happen, but a modicum of stability (vis-a-vis Pakistan) did. Prior to the installation of the Taliban, various factions vying for control over Afghanistan took their battles, literally, to the streets of Pakistan. They set off car bombs and did other damage. The Pakistani army and intelligence services (and people) were NOT amused.

The Taliban are not natural leaders of Afghanistan in any way, shape or form, and are not viewed that way by basically any non-Pashtuns, and not really by many Pashtuns either as I understand it. They were accepted by many, especially in the beginning, because they brought an end to the chaos and fighting. Once the Afghan people got a taste of the Taliban, they were ready to throw them out.

Why do we care whether Hamid Karzi or the Taliban control Afghanistan? Afghanistan is one of the very poorest countries on earth. Even though it is nearly 100% Muslim, your average Muslim in another country doesn't begin to care about it (as they might Iraq, Egypt, and other countries of significance). Their only exports are poppy seeds and instability. They have no oil. On the other hand, they are strategically located, and are vital to the future of Pakistan. So they do matter.

As we all know, Bin Ladin had completely free reign in Afghanistan prior to 9-11. The Taliban ran things day to day, but Bin Ladin did as he pleased. So its perfectly fair to say that the Taliban attacked us. But would they dare do it again if they somehow regained power? Probably not. The best reason to be willing to spend lives and oodles of money to defeat the Taliban lies in Pakistan. Although Pakistan is poor as well, it has circa 180 million people, nearly all Muslim, most of a modern army, and many dozen nuclear weapons. Bin Ladin followers taking over Pakistan (as many have dreamt of for years) would be a HUGE disaster for American national security. In my view, a seriously first order problem. Andrew thinks that even in this godawful eventuality, we could rely on MAD (mutually assured destruction) to prevent them from getting too uppity. I don't. Religious nutjobs are just not nearly as predictable as the Soviets were. Besides, I'm not willing to bet New York on it. I'm highly confident that India feels the same way. Sure, Pakistan is their enemy. But the Pakistani regime mostly plays within defined bounds. (The terror attacks last year in Mumbai (formerly Bombay), which killed 173 people and were huge front page news worldwide were a glaring exception, but India knows perfectly well that Pakistan didn't orchestrate the attacks. Whether Al Queda (or the Taliban) would similarly confront India within a known parameter of permissible activity is another matter entirely. That's a question which India would greatly prefer not to have to answer.

I've made a leap that I should explain. There are several areas of Pakistan, near the Afghan border, which are in virtual open revolt against the Pakistan government. These are sometimes referred to as the Tribal areas, which is only one part of Pakistan that is in near revolt. It is in these border areas (including but not limited to the Swat Valley) where Bin Ladin and the rest of the remaining Al Queda leadership are thought to be hiding, and it is from these areas where the Taliban is launching their attacks across the border into Afghanistan. The Pakistani government is none too pleased at these developments. Although a cease fire was controversially signed between Pakistan and some of the rebel elements back in February, the Pakistani army has moved in in force in recent days.

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/08/world/asia/08pstan.html?ref=asia

Pakistan fears that the Taliban types, with the aid of Al Queda types, could be a grave threat to their (always weak) government. So they're pushing back hard in certain areas.

So what does Pakistan think of the Taliban war in Afghanistan? What with the rebellion going on near the border and all, and the army and the intelligence services being the only institutions in Pakistan worth a NYC subway ride, I doubt seriously they're going to see it in their long term interests for the Taliban to WIN in Afghanistan. For them to EXIST, maybe. Keeps the US interested, keeps our billions flowing into Pakistan, keeps us from following our foreign policy where it wants to go, which is a wholehearted embrace of India, for trade reasons, as a counterweight to China, and a counterweight to possible Islamic radicalism coming from Pakistan or Sri Lanka. (Was that the longest sentence you ever read?)

That's where gravity is (strongly) pulling the US foreign policy. Fear of Bin Ladinists controlling Pakistan's nukes are pulling in the other direction. Both the army and the ISI realize this, and are playing a bit of a dangerous double game, but they don't see it in their interests to order the army to turn border areas into rubble. They've, however, gone from playing patty cake with the rebels to playing a bit rough, and from the US perspective, that will just about do. I think the Pakistan/Afghan problem is approaching a sort of equilibrium. Pakistan sees the rearming of the Taliban and the chaos following in Afghanistan and sees a more than mini rebellion by very similar types in the north of Pakistan, with the aid of Al Queda. They've looked in the crystal ball and just cringed. So the army under MUSHARRAF preferred to play patty cake, while the army under weak civilian leadership is starting to crack heads. These people aren't Saddam's sycophant idiots. They have more than 1/2 a clue, the army does. And while they may not crack down hard enough to WIN (by which I mean crush the rebellion utterly) they will, I humbly predict, crack down hard enough not to lose (in Pakistan). Which is really more than enough from their perspective. India can tolerate this, the US can tolerate this, and at the very very VERY end of the day it may be that even the TALIBAN can tolerate this. Leverage from the US on the Afghan side of the border can badly squeeze an already somewhat squeezed Taliban until they slowly whither away into dust. That, in broad outline, is my Plan. I think it has a high chance of "success" and a low chance of bad failure (Al Queda types controlling swaths of Pakistan or, god forbid, the Pakistani military and with it its nuclear arsenal). It is for this reason that I support the escalation of the effort in Afghanistan-- not so much because its worth that much American money and blood to see who rules Afghanistan, but because it is worth lots of American treasure to ensure that the rebel types, aided and assisted by (and part and parcel of) the Taliban (and aided by Al Queda) don't rule Pakistan.